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Abstract. According to a classical narrative, early geneticists, failing to see how
Mendelism provides the missing pieces of Darwin’s theory, rejected gradual changes and
advocated an implausible yet brieﬂy popular view of evolution-by-mutation; after
decades of delay (in which synthesis was prevented by personal conﬂicts, disciplinary
rivalries, and anti-Darwinian animus), Darwinism emerged on a new Mendelian basis.
Based on the works of four inﬂuential early geneticists – Bateson, de Vries, Morgan and
Punnett –, and drawing on recent scholarship, we offer an alternative that turns the
classical view on its head. For early geneticists, embracing discrete inheritance and the
mutation theory (for the origin of hereditary variation) did not entail rejection of
selection, but rejection of Darwin’s non-Mendelian views of heredity and variation, his
doctrine of natura non facit saltum, and his conception of ‘‘natural selection’’ as a
creative force that shapes features out of masses of inﬁnitesimal diﬀerences. We ﬁnd no
evidence of a delay in synthesizing mutation, rules of discrete inheritance, and selection
in a Mendelian-Mutationist Synthesis. Instead, before 1918, early geneticists had
conceptualized allelic selection, the Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium, the evolution of a
quantitative trait under selection, the probability of ﬁxation of a new mutation, and
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other key innovations. Contemporary evolutionary thinking seems closer to their more
ecumenical view than to the restrictive mid-twentieth-century consensus known as the
Modern Synthesis.
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Introduction
The scientists who embraced the early ﬁndings of genetics – particulate
inheritance, mutation, and the ineﬃcacy of selection in a pure line – are
known as ‘‘Mendelians,’’ ‘‘early geneticists’’ or sometimes, ‘‘mutation-
ists.’’ Although historical treatments of the Mendelians’ evolutionary
views are often contradictory, the elements of what we will call a
‘‘classical view’’ may be discerned in early writings of the Modern
Synthesis, particularly Fisher (1930, 1932) and J. Huxley (1942), and in
later works of history by Eiseley (1958), Provine (1971), Allen (1978, pp.
106–125), Mayr (1982), and Bowler (1978, 1983, 1988).1
According to Bowler (2003), the evolutionary views of Mendelians
and other non-Darwinians typically are seen as a ‘‘blind alley,’’ separate
from the ‘‘main line leading from Darwin to modern Darwinism’’ (p.
224). The classical view holds that, though genetics is the ‘‘perfect
complement’’ to Darwin’s theory (Provine, 1971, p. 130), literally sup-
plying its ‘‘missing parts’’ (Froggatt and Nevin, 1971, p. 22), early
geneticists failed to see this, resulting in a ‘‘delay in applying Mendelian
principles to an understanding of evolution’’ (Allen, 1969, p. 61; Pro-
vine, 1971, p. 177). The early geneticists opposed natural selection (e.g.,
Provine, 1971, Ch. 4; Allen, 1980; Mayr, 1982, p. 546; Bowler, 1988, pp.
117–125; 2003, p. 308),2 and imagined that evolution must take place by
major discontinuities, dismissing a role for smooth change based on
continuous variation (Provine, 1971, p. 89; Allen, 1980; Mayr, 1980;
Bowler, 1988, p. 122; Mayr, 1988, p. 107, 1991).
In the classical view, it takes several decades to correct these
misimpressions: (1) de Vries’s Oenothera mutants are revealed as
1 Bowler subverts the classical narrative in ways noted below. Provine’s account is
suﬃciently rich as to support alternative readings, as will become apparent below.
2 The theme of opposition is consistent, but it is often unclear what this opposition
signiﬁes. For instance, Provine’s text provides many indications that early Mendelians
invoked selection, yet repeatedly references an opposition between (1) ‘‘selection,’’
‘‘Darwinian selection theory,’’ or ‘‘the eﬃcacy of selection’’ and (2) Mendelians,
‘‘mutation,’’ or ‘‘discontinuous evolution’’ (Ch. 4).
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chromosomal abnormalities based on hybridization, not true gene
mutations (Bowler, 2003, pp. 269, 327; Provine, 1971, pp. 121–122;
Eiseley, 1958, p. 251; Mayr, 1982, pp. 546, 743); (2) the concept of
‘‘mutation’’ is revised to allow changes with small eﬀects, based on
Morgan’s mutant white-eyed ﬂy (e.g., Provine, 1971, pp. 109, 121;
Mayr, 1982, pp. 752, 774; Allen, 1980, p. 371); (3) a multiple-factor view
emerges in which evolution takes place by selection of recombinations
among alleles at multiple loci, without new mutations (Provine, 1971,
pp. 108–129; Mayr, 1980, 1994).
Evidently these internal factors are not considered suﬃcient to ac-
count for the ‘‘inexplicable embarrassment’’ (Hull, 1985) of a decades-
long eclipse, inviting the search for external factors.3
However, rather than searching for external factors, one might
consider instead that the internalist framework of the classical narrative
is mistaken. In fact, its key features are contradicted frequently (even in
classical sources). The Mendelians’ alleged opposition to selection is
problematic, as is their alleged rejection of small changes. Gayon argues
that ‘‘the Mendelians were responsible for the operational deﬁnition of
natural selection that is most widely used today – the diﬀusion of a gene
in a population’’ (Gayon, 1998, pp. 181–182). Both Nordmann (1992)
and Peterson (2008) reject the classical view of Bateson as the anti-
Darwinian whose misunderstandings delayed the Modern Synthesis.
Whereas Provine depicts Bateson as the radical advocate of evolution
by ‘‘discontinuous leaps’’ (p. 42), he quotes statements in which Bateson
invokes ‘‘the subsequent perfection’’ of a form ‘‘by a slow process of
selection’’ (p. 46), and a Mendelian basis for superﬁcially continuous
change ‘‘when the unit of segregation is small’’ (p. 69). According to
Gould (2002, p. 443), de Vries was a strong advocate of selection.
Bowler (1978) and Theunissen (1994, p. 244) indicate that de Vries
assumed neither that all mutations create new species, nor that they
always represent large or saltatory eﬀects. Apparently, if the Mendelians
opposed selection and gradual change in some ways, they embraced
them in others.
3 See Smocovitis (1996) for an entre´e to this literature. The most prominent theme is
that diﬀerent schools or disciplines owned diﬀerent parts of the truth, and synthetic
thinking was prevented by conﬂicts, including personal conﬂicts (Froggatt and Nevin,
1971; Provine, 1971) and disciplinary rivalries, e.g., between ‘‘naturalists’’ and experi-
mentalists (e.g., Kingsland, 1991). Many authors invoke an atmosphere of prejudice or
irrational opposition to Darwin or his thinking (Bowler, 1988, Ch. 5; Allen, 1969, 1980,
p. 368; Kingsland, 1991). Others invoke a cognitive deﬁciency of early geneticists, such
that they were muddled, confused, or unable to think synthetically (e.g., Froggatt and
Nevin, 1971; Allen, 1980, pp. 356, 373, 374).
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Other works calls into question an alleged decades-long eclipse in
synthetic thinking. In Kim’s analysis (1994; see also Buttolph, 2008), the
Mendelian students of Bateson and Pearson (whose students mostly
defected to Mendelism) quickly develop the multiple-factor theory
addressing the potential for selected change on a range of quantitative
variation. Similarly, Gayon argues that ‘‘the fundamental doctrines of
quantitative genetics were developed early in the century, long before
the publication of Fisher’s canonical article of 1918 which is often
credited with having laid the foundations of the discipline’’ (Gayon,
1998, p. 316). Even Provine’s (1971) account, when read closely, fails to
reveal a decades-long failure of synthesis.4
The ‘‘missing piece’’ theory is criticized by Bowler (1988, pp. 106,
113, 130) for its implication, clearly mistaken, that Darwin had no
substantive view of heredity and variation. Bowler (1988) and others
(e.g., Winther, 2000) draw attention to the profound diﬀerences between
a nineteenth-century view of heredity, variation and evolution as
manifestations of growth and development – a ‘‘developmental view-
point that Darwin had left largely intact’’ (Bowler, 1988, p. 114) –, and
the Mendelian view of pure factors unaﬀected by growth, metabolism,
and external conditions. Darwin recognized a direct inﬂuence of the
environment and of use-and-disuse on heredity, believing that all vari-
ation is triggered by environment (Winther, 2000). Stubbe (1972, p. 219)
writes that Darwin built his theory mistakenly on ‘‘secondary forms of
variability, namely, variations in the phenotype caused by external
inﬂuences.’’
The premise that Mendelism is the perfect complement to Darwin’s
theory is further subverted in Gayon’s Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival
(1998), which argues that Darwin’s original conception of ‘‘natural
4 Chapter 4 of Provine (1971) depicts (1) an early period of building synthetic con-
cepts and obtaining key results (featuring the work of Johannsen, East, Nilsson-Ehle
and Castle) that began immediately in 1900 and was largely complete by 1911 or 1912,
when these key ﬁndings were ‘‘well known’’ (p. 121) to geneticists, followed by (2) a brief
period during which, Provine alleges, resistance to generalizations based on these results
gave way to consensus by 1918 or 1919 (see p. 108). After these conceptual and
experimental foundations are in place, a mathematical theory is built by Fisher, Hal-
dane and Wright in the 1920s. Provine’s account reveals that each of the three pre-1920
theoretical milestones – the Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium (1908), the allelic selection
model (1915), and Fisher’s quantitative trait model (1918) –, was preceded by a series of
even earlier (often ﬂawed or incomplete) theoretical results. In other words, the facts of
Provine’s account show the period of 1900–1918 to be, not a period of stultifying delay,
but a period of dizzying experimental, conceptual and theoretical innovation.
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selection’’ depends on blending inheritance. This built-in conﬂict with
the discrete basis of heredity represents a ‘‘principled crisis’’ or
‘‘founding crisis’’ (pp. 1–15) that ends with ‘‘the most important event in
the history of Darwinism’’ (p. 289): geneticists re-conceive selection as a
force that shifts frequencies of true-breeding types. The new concept
then could be used (by Fisher and others) to show how selection on a
recombining mass of small-eﬀect genetic variations could produce a
smooth adaptive shift in phenotypes, mimicking Darwin’s theory using
a diﬀerent mechanism.
A more thorough analysis of the evolutionary views of early genet-
icists might clarify, not only issues of interest to historians, but ongoing
issues of theory-evaluation among scientists. When scientists relate how
the discovery of genetics aﬀected evolutionary thinking, they nearly
always invoke a caricature of the classical view in which bumbling
geneticists fail to ﬁnd the missing piece, and foolishly imagine that
evolution happens by dramatic mutations alone, without selection (e.g.,
Dawkins, 1987, p. 305; Cronin, 1991, p. 47; Ayala and Fitch, 1997;
Eldredge, 2001, p. 67; Segerstra˚le, 2002; Charlesworth and Charles-
worth, 2009). Accordingly, when scientists list major evolutionary ﬁg-
ures, a large gap appears between nineteenth- and twentieth-century
progenitors.5 Surely the ongoing scientiﬁc debate over the meaning and
status of the twentieth-century Darwinian synthesis, which often makes
reference to history (e.g., Pigliucci, 2009; Chouard, 2010), would beneﬁt
from an accurate history of this early period, and in particular, would
beneﬁt from a clearer picture of how a Mendelian view that combines
genetics and selection could be so non-Darwinian as to have been
thoroughly excluded.
Here we aim to present the Mendelian alternative to Darwinism from
the perspective of those who developed it, not those who rejected it. Our
analysis focuses narrowly on scientiﬁc (not external) arguments based
5 For instance, the contemporary Oxford Encyclopedia of Evolution (Pagel, 2002) has
a biographical entry for Mendel – who made no direct contributions to evolutionary
theory –, but lacks entries for Bateson, de Vries, Johannsen, and Punnett; the entry for
Morgan says nothing of his evolutionary views. The historical timeline of inﬂuential
thinkers in a popular educational resource (http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/history/
evotmline.html) goes from Darwin, Weismann, and others in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, then jumps to Wright, Fisher, et al., indicating a lack of key contributions for
about three decades.
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on key works of de Vries, Bateson, Morgan and Punnett, whom we take
to be foremost among the early geneticists (see Buttolph, 2008) known
for their evolutionary heterodoxy during the alleged ‘‘eclipse.’’ The ﬁrst
three are unarguably the early geneticists implicated most often in the
classical view. Hugo de Vries, the Dutch botanist, published his Mu-
tationsTheorie (1901) in German, but also published in English (de
Vries, 1905), and lectured in the US repeatedly before 1910. The British
geneticist William Bateson wrote Materials for the Study of Variation
(1894) before becoming the foremost interpreter and defender of
Mendelism in the English-speaking world (Bateson and Saunders, 1902;
Bateson, 1902, 1909a, b). Thomas Hunt Morgan, the American
embryologist and geneticist who later won a Nobel Prize for his work on
genetics, wrote several books on evolution (Morgan, 1903, 1916, 1925,
1932). To these three, we add Reginald Crundall Punnett,6 whose
Mendelism (1905, 1911, 1915), the ﬁrst textbook of genetics, presented a
synthetic view of evolution, and was translated into multiple languages,
going through new editions every few years until the late 1920s (Crew,
1968).
First, on the basis of these works, we describe the mutationist
critique of Darwin’s theory, which rejects the heritability of envi-
ronmentally-induced ﬂuctuations; rejects Darwin’s doctrine of natura
non facit saltum; and rejects the claim that natural selection is crea-
tive. The early geneticists’ skepticism in regard to smooth change
based on continuous variation, almost universally misconstrued, was
6 Punnett’s stature is indicated by (1) his debate with Poulton over the evolution of
mimicry, culminating in an early book (Punnett, 1915) targeted for criticism by Fisher,
and still cited by scientists (e.g., Balogh and Leimar, 2005) as a historic touchstone, and
(2) direct historic references such as Wallace’s (1909) personal criticism of ‘‘Bateson,
Punnett, de Vries and Company’’ as ‘‘the self-deluded specialists’’ of the new view, and
Reid’s (1913) attack on the ‘‘Mendelo-Mutationists’’ targeting Bateson, Punnett and
Morgan. Other early geneticists of interest include Wilhelm Johannsen, Charles Dav-
enport, Lucien Cue´not, Robert Heath Lock, and Richard Goldschmidt. All but
Goldschmidt are recognized in Buttolph’s (2008) study as early geneticists, active in the
ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century. Johannsen’s experimental results were profoundly
inﬂuential, but the direct inﬂuence of Johannsen’s evolutionary thinking was, we sus-
pect, less than that of Punnett. Lock (1906), Davenport (1909), Cue´not (1909), and
Goldschmidt (1911) similarly appear to have been secondary inﬂuences on evolutionary
discourse in the early period of interest here. Goldschmidt later became well known as
an advocate of macromutations (Dietrich, 2003).
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predominantly a narrow, experimentally justiﬁed rejection of Dar-
win’s non-Mendelian view based on environment-stimulated ﬂuctua-
tions. Second, we describe a generalized Mendelian-Mutationist view
and list eight areas in which the synthetic thinking of early geneticists
remains relevant to contemporary science. We note that non-Dar-
winian ideas have re-entered contemporary evolutionary biology to
such a degree that the Mendelian-Mutationist synthesis should be
reconsidered as the foundation of evolutionary thought. We suggest,
contrary to the classical view, that the revolutionary synthetic period
in evolutionary thinking is from 1900 to 1930, and the embarrassing
eclipse is the subsequent period of orthodoxy that, for several dec-
ades, convinced historians and scientists to imagine that genetics is
the missing piece of a Darwinian theory that accounts generally for
evolution.
Mutation, Selection, and the Mutationist Critique
Before presenting the Mendelians’ positive views of evolution, we
present their critique of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. To con-
textualize this critique, we must explain what ‘‘mutation’’ and ‘‘natural
selection’’ meant to early geneticists.
The Theory of Mutation
Controlled breeding experiments using Mendelian diﬀerences revealed
that some kind of factor must pass (via gametes) from grandparent to
parent to child in a pure form, not blended or corrupted. Just as a
complex chemical mixture – to use a favorite metaphor of de Vries
(1909a, p. 3) – ultimately resolves to combinations of discrete and
constant elements, so do organisms. Mendelism is not a theory of
growth-like change, but a theory of chemical constancy with conser-
vative reconﬁgurations. Such a view begs for a theory of mutation, as
Pearson (1906) argues (see also Shull 1907):
… there must be a manifest want in Mendelian theories of inheri-
tance. Reproduction from this standpoint can only shake the
kaleidoscope of existing alternatives; it can bring nothing new into
the ﬁeld. To complete a Mendelian theory we must apparently
associate it for the purposes of evolution with some hypothesis of
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‘‘mutations.’’ The chief upholder of such an hypothesis has been de
Vries… (p. 39)
The terms ‘‘mutation,’’7 ‘‘mutation theory’’, and ‘‘mutationist’’ rose
to prominence soon after de Vries’s (1901) MutationsTheorie, which
raises the question of whether a ‘‘mutationist’’ or advocate of ‘‘the
mutation theory’’ is (1) an advocate of a general theory proposing
that genetic factors change by discrete events, or (2) an advocate of
de Vries’s special views. De Vries recognized several categories of
mutations, as distinct from ﬂuctuations, the most important being
‘‘progressive’’ mutations that arise only during rare ‘‘mutation peri-
ods’’ and generate reproductively isolated species with new characters
(Theunissen, 1994; Stamhuis et al., 1999). He allowed for temporary
change by selection of ﬂuctuations, which he held to have limited
heritability (Theunissen, 1994, p. 229; Meijer, 1985, pp. 199, 208).
In the passage quoted above, Pearson’s use of ‘‘some hypothesis’’ (of
mutation) and ‘‘such an hypothesis’’ implies that, for him, de Vries’s
special view is merely one instance of a general concept of mutational
shifts. Morgan (1903) likewise invokes mutation in a more general way:
It should be stated here, at the outset, that the term mutation will be
used in the following chapters in a very general way, and it is not
intended that the word shall convey only the idea which De Vries
attaches to it; it is used rather as synonymous with discontinuous
and also deﬁnite variation of all kinds. (p. 340)
7 In writings of this period, it may be hard to tell whether ‘‘mutation’’ refers to a
variant form, an event, a diﬀerence, a process, or something else. In our sources, con-
crete references (e.g., ‘‘it is a mutation,’’ ‘‘the dwarf mutation’’) typically are best
understood as references to a variant phenotypic form, with the implication that this
form arose by a process of mutation, and is the realization of a discrete genetic class.
For instance, when Punnett says that ‘‘The dwarf mutation is subject to ﬂuctuating
variations which are probably due to the environment peculiar to each individual’’
(1905, p. 49), it is clear that the ‘‘mutation’’ refers to a genotypically-deﬁned class
comprising individual phenotypic forms, which is subject to environmental sources of
variance, rather than to the underlying genotype, which is not. As researchers began to
distinguish transmission genetics from developmental genetics, ‘‘mutation’’ began to
take on the modern sense of a transmissible genetic change, as distinct from its phe-
notypic eﬀects.
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In context, ‘‘deﬁnite’’meanshavingadistinctive andconstant aspect, such
as may recur recognizably in progeny. Likewise, Bateson (1909b) writes8:
We may be doubtful of the validity of the superstructure which de
Vries has created, and yet in full agreement with him in recognizing
the fundamental truth, that there is a natural distinction between
ﬂuctuational variations and actual genetic variations; that the latter
are those alone by which permanent evolutionary change of type
can be eﬀected; and that commonly, though, as it seems to me, not
always, the steps by which such changes occur are so discontinuous
as to merit the name Mutations. (p. 287)
Morgan (above), as well as Punnett (quoted below) tended to imply that
‘‘mutations’’ are, per deﬁnitionem, the kinds of variations that are her-
itable, whether they are large or small, while Bateson distinguishes
‘‘actual genetic’’ variations from ﬂuctuations. Other geneticists of this
era also invoked mutation or ‘‘mutation theory’’ as a generic theory of
hereditary variation, not tied to the size of variation, but to heritability:
There is no saying,with respect to anyparticular variation,whether it
may belong to the one or to the other class, before the actual test
(pedigree-culture) [to determine if the variation is inherited] has been
made, although it seems thatmutations often or generally diﬀer from
ﬂuctuating variations in the degree of deviation from the original
form. This is the essence of the mutation theory. (Ortmann 1907)
Mutations can only be recognized as such with certainty when they
arise in pure-bred strains. They are not to be distinguished from
ﬂuctuations by being large and striking variations but by the fact
that they represent a fundamental change in the internal compo-
sition or structure of the vital substance, which renders the char-
acteristic qualities of the new form transmissible through sexually
produced seeds. Variations that are thus transmitted are often very
insigniﬁcant, quantitatively, compared with others that are not so
transmitted. (Shull 1907, p. 61)
By contrast, the classical view claims that ‘‘mutations’’ initially referred
to dramatic species-creating mutations, and shifted in meaning only
when Morgan’s white-eyed mutant ﬂy revealed in 1910 that mutations
8 Bateson’s doubts about de Vries’s ‘‘superstructure’’ partly reﬂect the suspicion,
later proved correct, that the Oenothera mutants represent a special case based on
‘‘some unsuspected original cross,’’ i.e., hybridism (Bateson and Saunders 1902, p. 156,
note 2).
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could be small in eﬀect, and when Davis’s studies (1912–1915) under-
mined the signiﬁcance of de Vries’s Oenothera mutants (e.g., Allen,
1969, 1980; Provine, 1971, p. 109; Mayr, 1980, 1982, pp. 752, 774; 1991,
p. 133). None of these authors explain by what standard a white-eyed ﬂy
is considered a ‘‘small’’ variation relative to well known examples – e.g.,
Mendel’s wrinkled peas, or Johannsen’s diﬀerently sized beans – that
were assumed to have arisen by some unobserved mutation in the past.
In fact, as shown above, geneticists already accepted that mutations
could be smaller than ordinary ﬂuctuations, whereas white-eyed ﬂies are
outside the normal range of variation (which is precisely why they
caught Morgan’s attention). For instance, Richmond (2006, p. 471)
quotes from a 1909 work by Shipley, who explains his view allowing
small mutations by quoting Punnett (1905):
Doubtless some of the so-called ﬂuctuations are in reality small
mutations, whilst others are due to environmental inﬂuence… The
simultaneous existence of small mutations and large ﬂuctuations
leads to the disguising of the former by the latter. (p. 51)
The fact that multiple authors invoked such mutations, which were too
small to be detected experimentally, suggests that their existence was
inferred in some way, as indicated when Punnett (1905) writes, ‘‘a
cursory examination of the horticultural literature must convince any-
one, that it is by selection of mutations, often very small, that the
gardener improves his varieties’’ (pp. 52–53). Clearly the notion of a
1910 shift in the connotations of ‘‘mutation’’ does not apply to early
geneticists.9
Natural Selection in Historical Context
The idea of ‘‘natural selection’’ invoked by scientists today has been
reconﬁgured to ﬁt a world of discrete inheritance (Gayon 1998). In such a
world, it is natural to imagine that changemight beginwith some rare trait
that confers a small advantage, e.g., 2%, so that individuals with the trait
tend to leave more oﬀspring that, in turn, inherit the 2% advantage and
leave more oﬀspring. Over time, the trait increases in frequency until it
prevails. To a contemporary reader, this is ‘‘natural selection.’’
Such a process of ‘‘natural selection’’ cannot occur in Darwin’s
world, in which hereditary substances are inconstant even in an indi-
9 This would include Johannsen (see Roll-Hansen 1989, p. 319) and perhaps others
such as Castle (1905).
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vidual’s lifetime, and lose their identity entirely each generation, due to
blending during reproduction (Winther, 2000). As Gayon (1998) ex-
plains, by reference to Fleeming Jenkin’s famous critique:
as Jenkin points out, Darwin’s theory is ‘surely not’ that the
advantage given by a sport is retained in its descendants. The only
hypothesis of heredity under which natural selection would clearly
be eﬀective is not the one advanced by Darwin. To admit that
selection only consists in spreading prepotent anomalies would be
to accept that nature proceeds by leaps. (p. 91)
Instead, in Darwin’s view, the struggle for life shapes organisms by
leveraging many small separate diﬀerences that blend together in oﬀ-
spring. If 50 individuals have thicker fur, this is not due to a pure factor
they inherited from a common ancestor, but because, out of all the
indeﬁnite variations stimulated by conditions of life, 50 happened to go
in the direction of thicker fur. If these diﬀerences contribute to success
in the struggle for life, they will be summed and blended in the next
generation.
Both the Mendelian and the Darwinian view allow the complete
transition from an ancestor population with one state, to a descendant
population with another state. The diﬀerence emerges when one ima-
gines the half-way point: in a Mendelian or Jenkinian world, 50% of the
population has the new state, and there is no intermediate in which
100% of the population has changed halfway.10 By contrast, in the
Darwinian world, blending makes the converse true: at the halfway
point, 100% of the population has changed halfway, but there is no
point at which 50% has changed all the way. If we allow a bit of random
noise, these two views might look the same when the change involves a
few extra hairs on a ﬂy’s abdomen, but they cannot look the same if the
change involves an extra pair of wings. In the Darwinian view, these two
states must be separated by thousands of phenotypic intermediates.
Thus, when Darwin says that ‘‘natural selection can act only by the
preservation and accumulation of small inherited modiﬁcations’’
10 One might imagine, as an extreme case, a Mendelian world in which selection takes
place simultaneously on pre-existing variation at many recombining loci, with the
variation at each locus having a tiny eﬀect. Throughout an episode of change, the
population shows a smooth distribution (e.g., a bell curve) that shifts gradually. At the
halfway point, the mean value is halfway between the ancestral and the derived state.
This scenario makes the Mendelian world look superﬁcially like the Darwinian one,
though on an entirely diﬀerent mechanistic basis. As discussed below, this is precisely
the scenario invoked by Darwin’s mid-twentieth-century followers to argue that Men-
delian genetics supplies the missing pieces of Darwin’s theory.
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(Darwin, 1872, Ch. 4) or that his theory would ‘‘utterly break down’’ if
it could be shown that any feature had not arisen by numerous suc-
cessive slight modiﬁcations, he is not making a logical error, and he is
not restricting a modern (generic) principle of selection with an extrinsic
doctrine of gradualism. Instead, smooth change is mechanistically
intrinsic to Darwin’s conception of ‘‘natural selection’’: Darwin says
explicitly that natura non facit saltum ‘‘must on this theory be strictly
true’’ (Darwin, 1872, Ch. 6).
The Mutationist Critique: Saltation, Fluctuation and Creativity
With the above background, it is now possible to present the muta-
tionist critique of Darwin’s theory. The ﬁrst key component of this
critique was the argument for saltation or discontinuity: some evolu-
tionary changes have the quality of jumps. The early geneticists devel-
oped and extended an argument for saltation based on the plausibility
of discontinuous (deﬁnite) variations as the basis of evolutionary
change, beginning with Bateson’s Materials for the Study of Variation
(1894), a compendium of 886 cases of discontinuous variants, and
continuing with de Vries’s Die MutationsTheorie (1901).
Bateson, de Vries, Morgan and others (e.g., Davenport 1909) did not
focus solely, nor even largely, on the notion that some variations are
quantitatively large. Instead, they focused on variations being discon-
tinuous or deﬁnite, words used frequently and apparently interchange-
ably by Bateson (1909b, p. 286) and Morgan (1904, p. 60), though there
is a subtle diﬀerence in connotation. There is no conceptual diﬃculty in
imagining the gradual appearance, by a thousand inﬁnitesimal incre-
ments, of an extra petal on a ﬂower, or an extra ﬁnger on a hand, or an
extra vertebra in a neck or tail: in each case, we can imagine the feature
appearing one cell, or one molecule, at a time. Yet, Bateson and others
were impressed with observations suggesting that fully formed parts
may appear suddenly, without intermediates or preparatory stages, and
persist in progeny, obviously without having been brought into exis-
tence by a slow process of selection. The resulting variants have a
property of deﬁniteness, which may be invoked with words such as
‘‘deﬁnite’’ or ‘‘deﬁnitely constituted’’ (e.g., Morgan, 1903, pp. 95, 261,
340; 1904, p. 60; Bateson, 1894, pp. 64, 65), ‘‘complete’’ (Bateson, 1894,
p. 65), ‘‘orderly’’ (Bateson, 1909a), or ‘‘well developed’’ (Davenport,
1909).
Darwin himself allowed that, under domestication, striking new
forms may appear suddenly and be ‘‘transmitted in a perfect state’’
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(Darwin, 1868, Ch. 15). He depicted such forms as monsters, and
claimed that he ‘‘failed to ﬁnd, after diligent search, cases of mon-
strosities resembling normal structures in nearly allied forms, and these
alone bear on the question’’ (Darwin, 1872, Ch. 2). By contrast, Bateson
(1909b) argued that ‘‘inasmuch as the discontinuity of variation is
manifested again and again in respect of exactly those diﬀerences which
we are accustomed to recognize as distinguishing speciﬁc forms from
each other, the further conclusion followed that the diversity of species
may be regarded as having come about very largely by the occurrence of
these discontinuous variations’’ (p. 286).
Thus, the saltationist argument is that (1) there is a process giving
rise suddenly to deﬁnite forms that diﬀer discretely from their parents;
(2) the eﬀects of such changes are sometimes deﬁnitely heritable; and (3)
such diﬀerences play a signiﬁcant role in evolution, as suggested by their
similarity to natural species diﬀerences. Darwin had accepted the ﬁrst
two points, but rejected the third.
The second component of the mutationist critique concerns ﬂuctu-
ations, which are distinguished from mutations by hereditary constancy,
not size, as de Vries (1909b) makes clear:
Fluctuations constitute one type; they are never absent and follow
the law of chance [Quetelet’s law, resulting in a bell-shaped error
distribution], but they do not aﬀord the material from which to
build new species. Mutations, on the other hand, only happen to
occur from time to time. They do not necessarily produce greater
changes than ﬂuctuations, but such as may become, or rather are
from their very nature, constant. It is this constancy which is the
mark of speciﬁc characters, and on this basis every new speciﬁc
character may be assumed to have arisen by mutation. (p. 73)
When de Vries asserts that ﬂuctuations do not aﬀord material to build
new species, he does not mean they aﬀord no material for change, only
that this material is unsuitable for permanent or species-transcending
change. De Vries had a theory-based interpretation of ﬂuctuations as
changes in the number (rather than the character) of pangenes, inﬂu-
enced by nutrition and conditions: these ﬂuctuations are partially
heritable (rather than non-heritable), and they allow a mode of
selective improvement that may enhance a character (but not create
one), subject to gradual reversal when selection is relaxed (Theunissen,
1994, p. 229).
Other geneticists saw the issue diﬀerently. Fluctuation was under-
stood as a mode of non-heritable variation by Punnett (as quoted be-
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low), as well as Shull and Ortmann (as quoted above, in regard to
mutation). The fact that Punnett had misinterpreted de Vries was
pointed out to him by Poulton some years later (see Punnett, 1913).
Bateson (1909a) misrepresents de Vries when he writes that ‘‘we must, as
de Vries has shown, distinguish real, genetic, variation from ﬂuctua-
tional variations, due to environmental and other accidents, which
cannot be transmitted’’ (p. 95).
The distinction between ephemeral outward variations and heritable
internal changes drew much of its strength, perhaps, from Johannsen’s
inﬂuential series of quantitative experiments using the ‘‘Princess’’ vari-
ety of the common bean (Johannsen, 1909), which had achieved
important results by 1903 (summarized nicely by Gayon 1998, pp. 260–
266). In one set of experiments, Johannsen isolated 19 stable self-fer-
tilizing lines, each of which produced seeds with a diﬀerent average
weight. Planting any single variety would produce a smooth bell-shaped
distribution of seed weights, illustrating the ﬂuctuating variability of
seeds. He selected larger seeds from a pure line to plant a new genera-
tion, but the distribution of seed weights did not change, proving that
this newly arising variation was not heritable and would not serve as the
basis for improvement by selection.
The ﬁnding that ﬂuctuations were not suitable for selection was
understood as a refutation of Darwin’s theory of natural selection:
The distinction between these two kinds of variation, so entirely
diﬀerent in their causation, renders it possible to obtain a clearer
view of the process of evolution than that recently prevalent…
Evolution only comes about through the survival of certain vari-
ations and the elimination of others. But to be of any moment in
evolutionary change a variation must be inherited… This, as we
have seen, is the case for those variations which we have termed
mutations. For the inheritance of ﬂuctuations, on the other hand,
of the variations which result from the direct action of the envi-
ronment upon the individual, there is no indisputable evidence.
Consequently we have no reason for regarding them as playing any
part in the production of that succession of temporarily stable
forms which we term evolution. In the light of our present
knowledge we must regard the mutation as the basis of evolution –
as the material upon which natural selection works. For it is the
only form of variation of whose heredity we have any certain
knowledge.
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It is evident that this view of the process of evolution is in some
respects at variance with that generally held during the past half
century. (Punnett, 1911, pp. 139–140)
Note that Punnett deﬁnes ﬂuctuation by reference to environmental
causes. Or, in the words of Bateson (1909b):
The conception of Evolution as proceeding through the gradual
transformation of masses of individuals by the accumulation of
impalpable changes is one that the study of genetics shows imme-
diately to be false. Once for all, that burden so gratuitously
undertaken in ignorance of genetic physiology by the evolutionists
of the last century may be cast into oblivion. For the facts of
heredity and variation unite to prove that genetic variation is a
phenomenon of individuals. Each new character is formed in some
germ-cell of some particular individual, at some point of time. (p.
289)
This is not a rejection of selection or small variations, but a rejection of
a Darwinian process of modiﬁcation reliant on the blending of masses
of environmentally induced ﬂuctuations – a process in which it is
mechanistically impossible for evolutionary change to begin as Bateson
suggests, with a single variant individual.
The ﬁnal component of the mutationist critique is in regard to cre-
ativity. Darwin’s theory was received and defended as an alternative to
divine creation, with Natural Selection in the role of the creator that
shapes each being to its conditions. This creative role of selection is
conditional, not only upon the kinds of variations incorporated in
evolution, but on whether they are incorporated individually or in
masses: the creativity of selection can be defended only if features be-
come deﬁnite and distinctive by the selectively-guided accumulation of
many individually minor variations (see the excellent discussion by
Gould, 2002, pp. 137 to 146). In Darwin’s theory of pervasive variation,
a distinctive form can not persist beyond the current generation unless
selection holds it in place. But if deﬁnite and distinctive features appear
spontaneously through mutation, reappear in the next generation due to
inheritance alone, and particularly if they face the struggle for life
separately rather than in masses, then the potential for a uniﬁed creative
force of Natural Selection is lost, the ‘‘dual nature of the problem’’
(Morgan, 1903, p. 463) emerges, and the origin of novelty must be
sought (partly or wholly) in the internal causes of variation. As Morgan
(1904) argues (see also Morgan, 1903, p. 460):
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On the other hand, the theory of the survival of deﬁnite variations
refers the creation of new forms to another process, namely, to a
sudden change in the character of the germ. The creating has al-
ready taken place before the question of the survival of the new
form comes up. After the new form has appeared the question of its
persistence will depend on whether it can get a foothold (p. 64).
Similarly, de Vries (1905) argues:
Darwin discovered the great principle which rules the evolution of
organisms. It is the principle of natural selection… Of course, with
the single steps of evolution it has nothing to do. Only after the step
has been taken, the sieve acts, eliminating the unﬁt. The problem,
as to how the individual steps are brought about, is quite another
side of the question (pp. 6–7)
Likewise, Bateson (1909a) says:
We must relegate Selection to its proper place. Selection permits the
viable to continue and decides that the nonviable shall perish…
Selection determines alongwhich branchEvolution shall proceed, but
it does not decide what novelties that branch shall bring forth (p. 95)
And ﬁnally, Punnett (1911) says:
we now recognize that the function of natural selection is selection
and not creation. It has nothing to do with the formation of new
variation. It merely decides whether it is to survive or to be elim-
inated. (p. 143)
This argument – based on re-conceptualizing selection, and then using
the new concept against Darwinism – was not new. In fact, because this
objection was voiced in Darwin’s era, no speculation is required to
know his position. As Poulton (1909) relates, the argument was made in
1864 by the Duke of Argyll, who complained that Darwin’s theory was
‘‘not a theory of the Origin of Species at all, but only a theory on the
causes which lead to the relative success and failure of such new forms
as may be born into the world’’ (p. 45). Darwin responded
That may be a very good theory, but it is not mine, unless he calls a
bird born with a beak 1/100th of an inch longer than usual ‘a new
birth’; but this is not the sense in which the term would usually be
understood. The more I work the more I feel convinced it is by the
accumulation of such extremely slight variations that new species
arise. (p. 45)
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Thus, Darwin and the early Mendelians agree that a theory of evolution
based on inﬁnitesimal diﬀerences that blend in masses is fundamentally
diﬀerent from a theory that relies on distinctive single ‘‘births,’’ which
Darwin disavows as ‘‘not mine.’’
In summary, the mutationists had a substantive critique of Darwin’s
theory based on ﬂuctuation, saltation and creativity. The critique of
ﬂuctuation regards the mechanism of evolution, not its superﬁcial
appearance: regardless of the outward character of variations (e.g., sal-
tational or not), genetics vitiates Darwin’s ‘‘natural selection’’ because,
contrary to what Darwin claimed, variation has a discrete basis in
germline changes that emerge rarely and are not induced by conditions.
The critique of creativity, however, draws on both of the other arguments.
Mendelian-Mutationism as Twentieth-Century Synthesis
A Mendelian-Mutationist synthesis may be associated with the views of
Morgan, Bateson, Punnett and (to a degree that we do not explore here)
other early geneticists noted by Provine (1971), Kim (1994) and Butt-
olph (2008). Though de Vries advocated a theory of discrete inheritance,
and is one of the ‘‘rediscoverers’’ of Mendel’s hereditary principles, he
was not a Mendelian (Meijer, 1985; Theunissen, 1994), and his partic-
ular views were not shared by the other three. Though we mention de
Vries’s views on speciation below, we assign him only a peripheral role
in the Mendelian-mutationist synthesis (see Discussion).
By invoking such a synthesis, we mean to imply some things and not
others. To the extent that a genetic transformation in evolutionary
thinking divides the nineteenth century from the twentieth, this trans-
formation is evident in the works of Bateson, Morgan and particularly
Punnett, long before it is evident in works of Fisher, Haldane, or Dobz-
hansky. We do not mean to suggest that this theory achieved popularity,
nor that it was promoted as a complete or ﬁnished theory –Morgan (1923)
and Bateson (1922) both argued that amore complete theory of evolution
would have to await a more complete understanding of genetics.
Overview of the Synthesis
The generic core of Mendelian-mutationist thinking is evident in
Morgan’s statement that ‘‘evolution has taken place by the incorpora-
tion into the race of those mutations that are beneﬁcial to the life and
reproduction of the organism’’ (Morgan, 1916, p. 194), or Bateson’s
claim that
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Deﬁnite variational changes are being continually oﬀered, each
giving an opportunity to natural or to artiﬁcial selection, and we
need not hesitate to declare that of such materials the diversity of
nature has been compiled. If anywhere in such a province as evo-
lutionary science certainty may be reached, it is here. (Bateson
1909b, p. 288).
This statement invokes selection and implies the suﬃciency of mutation
as the source of variations for evolution.11
As a more thorough example, we draw attention to the 10-page
section on evolution that appears in Punnett’s book, Mendelism
(1905).12 Punnett begins with explaining how Mendelian genetics ‘‘has
led us to materially alter our ideas of the evolutionary process’’. He
poses a generalized theory consistent with Darwin’s view and his own:
The evolution of fresh species depends upon the action of natural
selection on the variations that occur in living forms. Individuals of
a species, which from their variations are more adapted to the
environment, survive in the struggle for existence; individuals less
adapted are placed at a disadvantage, and tend to perish in the
competition with their more favoured kin. (p. 45)
Punnett goes on to distinguish heritable mutations from non-heritable
ﬂuctuations. Traits such as height vary or ﬂuctuate due to environ-
mental factors (‘‘a little more manure in its particular patch of soil,
fewer surrounding weeds, greater freedom from the attacks of pests’’),
but there is no evidence that such environmental ﬂuctuations are heri-
table; by contrast, there is evidence that hereditary factors persist in a
stable form, and change by rare mutations.
One’s view of evolution, he argues, is ‘‘materially altered’’ on the
grounds that ‘‘the small ﬂuctuating variations are not the material on
which selection works.’’ Instead, ‘‘evolution takes place through the
11 Note that we have quoted several statements from Bateson that use a term such as
‘‘actual genetic variation’’ or ‘‘deﬁnite variational change’’ where others would use the
term ‘‘mutation.’’ Bateson, in spite of being a notorious ‘‘mutationist’’, almost never
uses the term ‘‘mutation’’ to describe his own thinking, e.g., he does so only once in his
1909 textbook (Bateson 1909b, p. 35). We are uncertain as to the reasons for this
tendency (possibly to avoid associations with de Vries’s special theory, or to avoid
speculating about the unobserved origin of an observed variant).
12 The short section on evolution appears on pp. 44 to 53 of the 1905 version. An
identical or nearly identical text appears in the 1907 version (pp. 64 to 74). The 1911
edition has been rewritten and expanded to include, among other things, a critique of
Darwin’s theory based on creativity (above), and an explanation of selection on a
quantitative character (below).
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action of selection on these mutations. Where there are no mutations
there can be no evolution.’’ The conjecture that discontinuous or sal-
tatory variations ‘‘played an important part in the production of spe-
cies’’ is referenced and attributed to Bateson. Yet Punnett repeatedly
notes that mutations may be small, and (as quoted earlier) suggests that
genuine mutations may be hiding among the ﬂuctuations.
We see little in Punnett’s chapter – now 109 years old – to oﬀend the
sensibilities of a contemporary scientist, except that the works of Bateson
and de Vries are referenced as correctives to Darwin’s views, and that
natural selection is said to ‘‘sift’’ variation. In the twentieth-century
orthodoxy, references to selection in terms of sieves and sifting are con-
demned as ‘‘downright misleading,’’ ‘‘exaggeration’’, or ‘‘over-simpliﬁ-
cation’’ (Dobzhansky, 1974), in preference to metaphors that anthropo-
morphize selection as an artistic creator – e.g., a painter, writer, or sculptor
that shapes, molds, builds and creates out of raw materials (Gould, 1977,
Ch. 4) –, which are not considered to be downright misleading.
Mendelian-Mutationist Innovations, in Contemporary Context
Bateson, Morgan, Punnett and de Vries applied new genetic ideas to
evolution in many ways, some of which are not important in contem-
porary thinking, e.g., de Vries’ theory of selection of ﬂuctuations, or
Bateson’s (1914) provocative thesis of evolution entirely by loss of
factors. Below we present eight areas in which the synthetic thinking of
the early Mendelians is relevant to contemporary evolutionary biology.
Our aim is to establish that the same scientists targeted in the classical
view for being on the wrong side of Darwinism (and for failing to
achieve a synthesis) developed and explored foundational concepts of
evolutionary genetics that remain relevant today.
The Bateson–Saunders Equilibrium
In a landmark report to the Royal Society, Bateson and Saunders (1902)
present some of their own genetical ﬁndings, and discuss the evolu-
tionary implications of Mendelism. In regard to a population with
recognizable Mendelian characters, they suggest:
It will be of great interest to study the statistics of such a popula-
tion in nature. If the degree of dominance can be experimentally
determined, or the heterozygote recognised, and we can suppose
that all forms mate together with equal freedom and fertility, and
that there is no natural selection in respect of the allelomorphs, it
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should be possible to predict the proportions of the several com-
ponents of the population with some accuracy. Conversely,
departures from the calculated result would then throw no little
light on the inﬂuence of disturbing factors, selection, and the like.
(p. 131)
This shows a concern for what is now called ‘‘population genetics,’’ and
more speciﬁcally, it is a concise verbal description of what is now called
the ‘‘Hardy–Weinberg Equilibrium,’’ a foundational model in popula-
tion genetics (Provine, 1971, pp. 131–135) that continues to play a role
in research (e.g., a search of PubMed yields over 3000 articles that
invoked ‘‘Hardy–Weinberg’’ in the past 10 years). Precisely as advo-
cated by Bateson and Saunders, the Hardy–Weinberg Equilibrium plays
the role of a zero-force model (i.e., a system at rest, with no ‘‘disturbing
factors’’) in understanding population-genetic causation: deviations
from equilibrium indicate the perturbing eﬀect of some factor or force.
Bateson and Saunders did not solve the mathematics of the Hardy–
Weinberg Equilibrium, but rather conceptualized the zero-force model
and foresaw its utility. It was Punnett who brought about the mathe-
matical solution by presenting the problem to Hardy, his Cambridge
colleague (Provine, 1971, p. 134). Punnett referenced Hardy’s 1908
solution in his 1911 textbook (p. 148) and later applied it to the analysis
of butterﬂy mimicry (Punnett, 1913, 1915).
Discrete Basis of Continuous Variation
Bateson immediately understood that explaining the heritability of a
quantitative traits such as stature (i.e., traits that appear to give a
smooth distribution) would require a multifactorial Mendelian view,
expressing this idea both with Saunders (1902, p. 155), and in his de-
fense of Mendelism (1902):
In the case of a population presenting continuous variation in re-
gard to say, stature, it is easy to see how purity of the gametes in
respect of any intensities of that character might not in ordinary
circumstances be capable of detection. There are doubtless more
than two pure gametic forms of this character, but there may quite
conceivably be six or eight. When it is remembered that each het-
erozygous combination of any two may have its own appropriate
stature, and that such a character is distinctly dependent on
external conditions, the mere fact that the observed curves of
stature give ‘chance distributions’ is not surprising and may still be
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compatible with purity of gametes in respect of certain pure types.
(p. 31)
Thus Bateson argues that the standard bell-shaped ‘‘chance distribu-
tion’’ may be compatible with Mendelism because it can result by the
combined eﬀects of a multiplicity of Mendelian diﬀerences (each with 2
homozygotes and 1 heterozygote) and non-heritable variation due to
‘‘external conditions.’’
By 1903, Johannsen had shown that, from a general population
showing a bell curve of variation, he could isolate individual lines that
each showed a diﬀerent bell curve of variation that remained constant.
Morgan (1916, p. 158) reproduced ﬁgures from Johannsen’s work
(Figure 1), arguing that the variations in a pure line are extrinsic to the
germ plasm, that populations are heterogeneous mixtures of types, and
that selection may move the distribution of a heterogeneous population,
a process that is haphazard – because the size of an individual bean
reﬂects haphazard environmental eﬀects, not just genetics – yet ‘‘almost
certain’’ in the long run (p. 160).
In other words, Bateson, Johannsen, Morgan, and Punnett (see be-
low) allowed that the characteristic bell-shaped distribution of a
quantitatively varying character may reﬂect either (1) ephemeral envi-
ronmental variations of a single underlying hereditary type, or (2) the
overlaying of environmental variation on a mixture of types, which is
how such distributions are understood today (with roughly equal con-
tributions of genetic and environmental variance, as in Mousseau and
Roﬀ, 1987). They did so prior to the work of Fisher (1918) that attri-
butes the variability of quantitative traits to (3) heritable variation al-
most exclusively (see Fisher, 1918, pp. 423–427).
Selection on a Quantitative Character
In 1904, Bateson suggested that ‘‘when the unit of segregation is small,
something mistakably like continuous Evolution must surely exist’’
(quoted by Provine, 1971, p. 69). Johannsen had created a mixed
population of known pure-breeding lines, using this in 1903 to show
that selection could sort out varieties, while not fundamentally changing
them. Data from some of Johannsen’s experiments are used in con-
temporary textbooks to illustrate principles of population genetics (e.g.,
Hartl and Clark, 1997, p. 409).
To explain how smooth change in a quantitative character can occur
under selection, Punnett (1911) constructs a hypothetical example with
three imaginary non-mixing strains A, B, and C, diﬀering in the weight
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of seeds (Figure 2). He explains that ‘‘a seed that weighs 12 grains may
belong to any of these three strains. It may be an average seed of B, or a
rather large seed of A, or a rather small seed of C’’ (p. 162). He then
theorizes about the eﬀect of selecting seed on the basis of size:
Figure 1. Johannsen’s decomposition experiment as shown by Morgan (1916, p. 158).
Morgan’s caption reads ‘‘Pure lines of beans. The lower ﬁgure gives the general popu-
lation, the upper ﬁgures give the pure lines within the population’’
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On this view we can understand why selection of the largest seed
raises the average weight in the next generation. We are picking
out more of C and less of A and B, and as this process is repeated
the proportion of C gradually increases and we get the appearance
of selection acting on a continuously varying homogenous mate-
rial and producing a permanent eﬀect (pp. 162–163)
By contrast, in Darwin’s view, the superﬁcial appearance that the whole
population has shifted continuously and homogeneously reﬂects an
underlying reality in which hereditary substances shift continuously and
then are blended into homogeneity. There is no apparent limit to this
process, because in Darwin’s theory, indeﬁnite variations (‘‘everywhere
present’’) continue to appear. Thus Morgan remarked that, under the
Darwinian view, one ought to be able to breed ‘‘pigeons with legs ﬁve
metres long’’ (Morgan 1903, p. 103).
The Mendelian alternative diﬀers in that (1) selection of a phenotypic
range implicates hereditary factors only indirectly and probabilistically;
(2) the end result is a not a new complement of hereditary factors, but a
mixture of old components in new proportions; and (3) without new
mutations, the population may not transcend the limits inherent in the
original population.
The last of these claims is either wrong or misleading. Whether or not
selection can produce a pigeon with legs 5 m long, selective breeding
from a population of individuals whose highest phenotypic value is Tmax
can generate a variety whose highest value exceeds Tmax even if selection
is merely sorting out pre-existing varieties, as in Punnett’s example. If
recombination is allowed, then the selected population can have a mean
Figure 2. Punnett’s illustration of the distribution of weights of individuals of three
diﬀerent classes in a mixed population (inspired by Johannsen’s experiments), used in
a didactic explanation of selection on a smoothly varying trait (1911, p. 161). See text
for explanation. Punnett’s original caption reads ‘‘Curves to illustrate the conception
of pure lines in a population’’
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(or even a minimum) that exceeds Tmax. The idea that the eﬀects of
selection are limited by the initial population is valid only in the sense
that it is limited by its hidden (abstract) genetic potential, not by the
actually observed phenotypic range. Contemporary students of popu-
lation genetics often make the latter mistake, according to Hartl and
Clark (1997, p. 413).
Note that Punnett’s example of sorting out existing varieties from
a superﬁcially smooth distribution, like Johannsen’s experiments,
falls short of the Modern Synthesis view, because it does not invoke
recombination to allow ‘‘selection,’’ without new mutations, to shift
the population well beyond the limits of the starting population, as
discussed further below (see Discussion). Punnett’s textbook
repeatedly invokes the idea of new combinations of genes as a basis
for evolution or practical breeding (e.g., Punnett, 1911, pp. 144,
156), thus recombination is a part of his theory of evolution.
However, in 1911 he evidently did not believe that recombination is
essential for illustrating how smooth change is possible in a Men-
delian world.
The Allelic Selection Model
Punnett’s Mimicry in Butterﬂies (1915) features a table of calculated
values showing the rise in frequency of a Mendelian variant under
the inﬂuence of selection. He had taken this problem to his colleague
Hardy, who passed it to H.T.J. Norton, who shared his results with
Punnett but did not publish them for over a decade (Norton 1928).
Provine (1971, pp. 137–139), who refers to Norton’s model as ‘‘the
perfect complement to Morgan’s theory of evolution by single gene
replacement,’’ notes that it was the stimulus for Haldane’s famous
series of allelic selection models in the 1920s – the work that earned
Haldane his status as a founder of population genetics. Today,
models of allelic selection, showing the rise of a rare favored allele,
are a staple of evolution textbooks (e.g., Freeman and Herron 1998,
Figure 5.6). Punnett invoked both the allelic selection model and the
Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium in his arguments on butterﬂy mimicry,
and though his assumptions were naı¨ve, he speciﬁcally invoked the
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allelic selection model as though it proved that selection can act
swiftly.13
Saltation by Mutation
The saltationism of de Vries and the Mendelians (described above)
entails (1) a rejection of Darwin’s abstract inﬁnitesimalism, and an
embrace of the contrary of allowing non-inﬁnitesimal eﬀects or jumps;
(2) a rejection of the view that the deﬁniteness (regularity, symmetry,
etc.) of an organic form can emerge only via many variations gathered
under the shaping inﬂuence of selection, and conversely, as an
endorsement of the notion that internal generative processes can give
rise to such deﬁniteness in a novel form; (3) an empirical argument (or a
research program) that aims to establish a prima facie case for saltation
based on the similarity of mutant forms to natural forms. All three
aspects are found in contemporary evolutionary biology.
Orr’s (2005) authoritative review addresses the ‘‘rise and fall’’ of the
‘‘micromutationist’’ view of the Modern Synthesis, concluding that
large-eﬀect variations commonly play a role in species divergence, and
characterizing inﬁnitesimalism as ‘‘little more than a mathematical
convenience’’ (see also the reference of Chouard 2010 to a discarded
‘‘gradualist dogma’’). Orr’s complaint that Fisher’s inﬁnitesimal model
stiﬂed research for decades by ‘‘assuming away’’ the problem recalls
Bateson’s sarcastic critique a century earlier, which Orr actually quotes:
By suggesting that the steps through which an adaptive mechanism
arose were indeﬁnite and insensible, all further trouble is spared.
While it could be said that species arise by an insensible and
imperceptible process of variation, there was clearly no use in tiring
ourselves by trying to perceive that process. (Bateson 1909a)
Several recent books on molecular evolution emphasize the well known
role of non-inﬁnitesimal mutations such as gene duplications, fusions,
lateral gene transfers, and genome doublings (Koonin, 2011; Nei, 2013;
Shapiro, 2011). Interestingly, in response to the claim by Shapiro (2011)
13 According to Punnett’s reasoning, because selection acts so swiftly, a polymor-
phism for mimicry would not persist for a long time if the mimics are beneﬁcial,
therefore the persistence of a polymorphism is evidence against mimicry as a beneﬁt (the
logic of this argument was undermined later by the recognition that a polymorphism
can be maintained indeﬁnitely by balancing selection). He further argues that the three
morphs (one non-mimetic) in an island population of P. polytes are in Hardy–Weinberg
equilibrium, concluding that selection must not be acting and that, therefore, the but-
terﬂies are not truly mimetic (Punnett 1913, 1915).
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that molecular saltations weigh against Darwinism, Dean (2012) replies
that the charge is ‘‘patently unfair’’ because ‘‘today’s Darwinists accept
Huxley’s criticism,’’ i.e., they have abandoned natura non facit saltum.
The remaining aspects of saltationism, i.e., (2) and (3) above, are
manifested in the contemporary ﬁeld of ‘‘evo-devo’’. A major project of
contemporary evo-devo is to develop a substantive theory of the gen-
eration of phenotypic variation by mutation and development (e.g.,
Kirschner and Gerhart, 2005; Hendrikse et al., 2007), carrying forward
Bateson’s (1894) vision. The premise of this project is that develop-
mental changes, by giving shape to phenotypic variation, give shape to
evolutionary change. Evo-devo-ists invoke development as a generative
process responsible for the deﬁniteness of variant phenotypes (e.g.,
Arthur, 2000), and they embrace a research program that (among other
pursuits) attempts to understand evolved diﬀerences in terms of the
distinctive phenotypic eﬀects of individual mutations (e.g., Stern, 2000).
Selection as a Stochastic Sieve for Mutations
According to Gayon’s (1998) thesis noted earlier, the new genetical
conception of selection as a frequency-shifting force is used to ratio-
nalize a more Darwinian conception of selection as a shape-shifting
force. However, neither of these conceptions of selection as a smooth
shifter captures the way in which Morgan, Punnett and de Vries often
evoked evolution as a stochastic process of the acceptance of lucky
mutations, with selection in the role of a ﬁlter or sieve that modulates
the chances of success. For instance, Morgan writes (1916; see also
Punnett, 1911, p. 142):
If through a mutation a character appears that is neither advan-
tageous nor disadvantageous, but indiﬀerent, the chance that it
may become established in the race is extremely small, although by
good luck such a thing may occur rarely. It makes no diﬀerence
whether the character in question is a dominant or a recessive one,
the chance of its becoming established is exactly the same. If
through a mutation a character appears that has an injurious eﬀect,
however slight this may be, it has practically no chance of
becoming established.
If through a mutation a character appears that has a beneﬁcial
inﬂuence on the individual, the chance that the individual will
survive is increased, not only for itself, but for all of its descendants
that come to inherit this character. (187–189)
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Morgan’s intuitive concept of the probability of ‘‘becoming established’’
corresponds to the population-genetics concept of a ‘‘probability of
ﬁxation’’ for a new mutation, and his remarks on this topic (including
the irrelevance of dominance or recessivity for the ﬁxation of a neutral
allele) are consistent with the mathematical theory developed several
years later by Haldane and Fisher (Stoltzfus, 2006).
Though the architects of the Modern Synthesis rejected this ‘‘lucky
mutant’’ view (e.g.,Mayr, 1963, pp. 101, 613), it returned whenmolecular
evolutionists re-conceptualized evolutionary change in terms of muta-
tions that selection either ‘‘accepts’’ or ‘‘rejects’’ (e.g., Eck and Dayhoﬀ,
1966, pp. 161, 200; King, 1971), acting as the ‘‘editor’’, not the ‘‘com-
poser’’, of the genetic message (King and Jukes, 1969). Molecular evo-
lutionists developed a mathematical model that links the rate of
evolutionary change directly to the rate of mutational origin of new al-
leles, and to their probability of ﬁxation (King and Jukes, 1969; Kimura
and Maruyama, 1969). Today these 2-step origin-ﬁxation models are an
important branch of theoretical evolutionary genetics with a variety of
applications (McCandlish and Stoltzfus, 2014), including approaches to
testing hypotheses about mutational or selective causes of evolutionary
biases (Streisfeld and Rausher, 2011), and models for exploring the
dynamics of adaptation (the ‘‘mutational landscape’’model ofOrr, 2002).
The concept that evolutionary change begins with a newmutation, rather
than with selection shifting the frequencies of pre-existing alleles
(‘‘standing variation’’) is ‘‘clearly the ruling paradigm’’ in molecular
studies, according to Hermisson and Pennings (2005; see also Barrett and
Schluter, 2008, p. 39).
Non-Random Mutation in Parallelism and Directionality
The Mendelian-Mutationist view suggested the possibility that internal
factors could inﬂuence the course of evolution by determining that some
kinds of mutations appear more often than others. Both Morgan (1910)
and Bateson (1909a) considered the possibility that the biased genera-
tion of mutations might account for directions or patterns.14 Morgan
proposed that mutation in a particular direction might be more likely,
ex posteriori, after an initial step that happens to be beneﬁcial: ‘‘After
the ﬁrst step, which was undirected, i.e., not purposeful, the subsequent
14 Whereas de Vries (by contrast) held that mutations happen ‘‘in all directions’’ (e.g.,
de Vries 1905, pp. 570, 719), his results indicated, that the same idiosyncratic mutations
occur repeatedly, a contradiction pointed out by Metcalf (1905).
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events are rendered more probable; for the dice are loaded’’ (Morgan,
1910, p. 208).
A more modest version of this idea was that the individual steps of
evolution, as accepted mutations, have directions that reﬂect the idio-
syncratic character of the mutation. It follows that parallel mutations
might account for parallel evolutionary changes: non-randomness in
mutation increases the chance of parallelism relative to the case in which
all possibilities have the same a priori likelihood. Fisher’s contrary
assumption that mutation is random, and cannot be a source of direc-
tion in evolution, was criticized directly by Punnett (1930) and Shull
(1935), who said that ‘‘It strains one’s faith in the laws of chance to
imagine that identical changes should crop out again and again if the
possibilities are endless and the probabilities equal’’ (p. 448).
Thus Morgan (1923) highlighted ‘‘recurrent and parallel mutants’’ as
‘‘one of the most interesting discoveries in recent genetic work’’, citing
cases in which similar mutations happen in closely related species. Pun-
nett also had argued that color variations in mice and rabbits were the
result of the same genetic factors, and that parallel variation could ac-
count for mimicry (Punnett, 1913). This idea that parallel variations may
lead to parallel patterns of species diﬀerences was taken to great lengths
by the renowned Russian geneticist Vavilov (1922), who had studied
genetics in England with Bateson, Biﬀen and Punnett (Adams, 1980).
In Bowler’s historical analysis, the hypothesis of biased variation as a
source of direction is taken to reﬂect the ‘‘anti-Darwinian’’ inclinations
of Bateson and Morgan (Bowler, 1988, p. 121). Today, the idea that
developmental biases on the production of variation shape evolution is
a major theme of ‘‘evo-devo’’ (Maynard Smith et al., 1985; Arthur,
2004). The similar idea that mutation biases shape genomes has been
common in molecular evolution for many years (see Stoltzfus and
Yampolsky, 2009). Contemporary evolutionists clearly have sought and
found evidence of parallel mutational changes, either directly at the
molecular level (Rogozin et al., 2008; Cunningham et al., 1997; Macey
et al., 1997; Hancock and Vogler, 2000) or via the analysis of parallel
evolution (Martin and Orgogozo, 2013; Denver et al., 2010; Christin
et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2005).
Speciation and Incompatibility
Bateson is quoted approvingly by Dobzhansky (1937) for his statement
that ‘‘though we cannot strictly deﬁne species, they have yet properties
which varieties have not, and… the distinction is not merely a matter of
degree.’’ Unlike Darwin, but like Dobzhansky (as well as earlier
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thinkers such as Huxley and Romanes), the early geneticists tended to
believe that reproductive incompatibilities were ‘‘the true criterion of
what constitutes a species’’ (e.g., Punnett, p. 151). With the Modern
Synthesis, the ‘‘biological species concept,’’ by which a species is deﬁned
in terms of the ability of organisms to interbreed, became the prevailing
view (Mallet, 2013).
Just as for contemporary researchers (Coyne and Orr, 2004), the
early geneticists considered both Mendelian and non-Mendelian causes
of incompatibility. A Mendelian idea suggested by Bateson (1909a) is
that, if an incompatibility is to arise by individual Mendelian changes in
a sexual population, it cannot involve just one change, otherwise the
initial mutant would be isolated from its breeding partners. However,
changes in two ‘‘complementary factors’’ that interact in some way
could result in an incompatibility. This idea is sometimes referred to as
the ‘‘Bateson-Dobzhansky-Muller’’ model (Orr, 1996), and remains a
central idea in contemporary thinking about the genetics of speciation
(Coyne and Orr, 2004).
The early geneticists also proposed non-Mendelian mechanisms. Bate-
son and Johannsen both believed that the operation of Mendelian factors
was superimposed on some more fundamental basis or residue that
underlies some kinds of incompatibility (Cock and Forsdyke, 2008).
However, de Vries’s ideas have been the most important non-Mendelian
ideas on speciation. As noted earlier, hisOenotheramutants were shown to
arise, via several diﬀerent types of complex changes in chromosomes, from
an original polyploid hybrid, rather than via ordinary gene mutation
(Sturtevant, 2001). Nevertheless, it is now known that most plant species
are ancestrally polyploid, and that the types of changes studied by de Vries
are quantitatively important in plant speciation (Nei and Nozawa, 2011).
Discussion
Our deliberate aim has been to provide an internalist rationale for the
evolutionary views of early geneticists. We have focused on Bateson, de
Vries, Morgan and Punnett as the early geneticists who most inﬂuenced
evolutionary discourse during the ﬁrst 2 decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. In the sections that follow, we address some diﬀerences between
our analysis and the classical view, and some of the questions that arise
from these diﬀerences, regarding ﬂuctuation, the ‘‘missing piece’’ the-
ory, and the curious case of Hugo de Vries.
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Contextualizing Fluctuation and Selection
The nineteenth-century view of ‘‘soft inheritance’’ is intrinsic to at least
two of the three major means of evolutionary modiﬁcation invoked by
Charles Darwin – direct action of the environment, and eﬀects of use
and disuse (Lamarckism). According to early geneticists, the same error
also pervades Darwin’s construction of ‘‘natural selection.’’ Morgan, de
Vries, Bateson and Punnett all rejected Darwin’s original theory because
they associated it fatally with the mistaken belief that environment-
stimulated phenotypic ﬂuctuations could be the basis of signiﬁcant
evolutionary changes. That is, Darwin’s claims for ‘‘natural selection’’
were understood to rely intrinsically on exactly the kind of environ-
mental variation that Johannsen isolated by studying ﬂuctuations in a
pure line, thus the failure of selection in a pure line showed precisely
that Darwin’s view could not be correct.
This issue does not appear overtly in the classical view. When early
geneticists point to a mechanistic distinction between ﬂuctuation and
mutation, classical authors treat this as a matter of size (small vs. large),
rather than a reference to an underlying mechanistic diﬀerence that is cor-
related loosely with size (e.g., Mayr, 1988, p. 527; Allen, 1980, pp. 367–370).
Mayr believed that ‘‘the components into which Darwin’s individual varia-
tion can be dissected show the same hard inheritance as sports or conspic-
uous mutations’’ (Mayr, 1980, p. 19). This failure to contextualize the
geneticists’ critique leads to several errors, including the notion that Jo-
hannsen’s results proved nothing, but merely gave credulous anti-Darwin-
ians a reason to reject selection prematurely. For instance, Ford (1938, p. 43)
states that the outcome of Johannsen’s experiments was ‘‘logically evident’’,
and proved nothing – which is true only if one already has (1) accepted
Mendelismand(2) editedDarwin’s theory.Likewise,Provine (1971) suggests
that the ‘‘pure line’’ theory (that selection cannot be eﬀective in a line puriﬁed
by inbreeding) is based on ‘‘circular reasoning’’ (p. 108). Sapp (2003) argues
that Johannsen’s experimentswere ‘‘faulty’’ becausehe ‘‘mistookanartiﬁcial
population for a natural one’’ (p. 145). Apparently, once Mendelism was
ﬁrmly established, the nineteenth-century theory of evolution-by-ﬂuctuation
largely went down the memory hole (with exceptions such as Roll-Hansen,
1989), and the incompatibility perceived a century ago between Darwin’s
theory and Johannsen’s results became an enigma to be addressed by appeal
to ‘‘anti-Darwinian prejudice’’ (Allen, 1980, p. 368) and the like.
Nevertheless, this issue emerges in many sources – not only the writings
of the early Mendelians, but of their opponents, and even in classical
histories. Defending Darwin at a time when Mendelism could be doubted,
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Cook (1908) argues that Mendel should have read Darwin more carefully;
that Darwin understood non-blending inheritance better thanMendel; that
Darwin correctly judged the theories of mutation and non-blending
inheritance to be incompatible with gradual evolution; and that Darwin
correctly concluded that evolution must have a diﬀerent basis, in the
inheritance and blending of ordinary variations. In Provine’s (1971) ac-
count, the conﬂict between Darwinian evolution-by-ﬂuctuation and
Mendelian genetics is revealed in passing at least three times,15 most
remarkably when Provine, noting that Pearson refused to consider (for his
journal Biometrika) the manuscript that became Fisher’s famous 1918
paper, reveals that ‘‘Pearson claimed, and Darwin would probably have
agreed, that the continuous variations in a pure line were heritable and that
continued selection in a pure line should be eﬀective’’ (p. 143).
The discovery that the non-heritability of environmental ﬂuctuations
was a crucial issue in the debate over evolution raises interesting ques-
tions about the extent to which scientiﬁc and historiographic views have
been shaped by interpretations of Darwin.16 Clearly, the Modern Syn-
15 The other two instances are as follows. Provine notes on p. 65 that de Vries’s
pangenesis theory, by eliminating any path for variations to ﬂow backwards from the
body to the germ-plasm, eliminates Darwin’s ‘‘major mechanism for the production of
individual diﬀerences, the raw material for selection,’’ i.e., Provine construes somatic
sources of variation as ‘‘major’’ in Darwin’s view. Darwinian evolution-by-ﬂuctuation
also intrudes when Provine cites a famous and long-running dispute over the signiﬁ-
cance of Castle’s selection experiments with the hooded rat (pp. 113 to 129). Castle
argued that his results indicated a role for continuous ﬂuctuations in the potency of
factors, while other geneticists, including members of the Morgan lab, argued for a
strictly Mendelian explanation. Oddly, Provine’s narrative (also Gayon, pp. 309 to 311)
presents Castle as a bellwether beset by obstructionists who doubt the power of selec-
tion, yet it was Castle – not the other geneticists – who doubted the suﬃciency of the
selection-Mendelism combination, until forced to concede in 1919.
16 Note that the geneticists’ interpretation is defensible, not merely as the proper
historical context for understanding their criticism of Darwin, but also as a matter of
how to understand Darwin’s true intent. Darwin believed that all variation is triggered
by conditions (Winther 2000), stating that ‘‘if it were possible to expose all the indi-
viduals of a species during many generations to absolutely uniform conditions of life,
there would be no variability’’ (Darwin 1868, Ch. 22). As Gayon (1998; see also Beatty
2010) has noted, Darwin deliberately chose to reject hard inheritance of individual
variants as the solution to Fleeming Jenkin’s criticism. Darwin staked his theory on the
blending of masses of inﬁnitesimal variations, and this was neither a capitulation nor a
reversal, but the solidiﬁcation and clariﬁcation of Darwin’s long-standing preference.
Darwin’s description of indeﬁnite variability or ordinary variation – indeﬁnite, arising
en masse every generation, stimulated by conditions of life (increasing under more
extreme conditions), and appearing to blend – ﬁts much more closely with phenotypic
ﬂuctuations due to conditions, than with the emergence of new genetic variation by
mutation or recombination.
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thesis established the compatibility of Darwinism and Mendelism, but
this was accomplished partly, and perhaps largely, by reinterpreting
Darwin to make room for Mendelism. The early geneticists reconceptu-
alized ‘‘natural selection’’ (Gayon, 1998), yet how did this new idea of
selection come to be attributed to Darwin instead of de Vries, Bateson
andMorgan? How and when did Darwin’s followers decide that it was all
right to ignore – and even to deny (as in the statement of Mayr quoted
above) – Darwin’s patently non-Mendelian views? Perhaps a ‘‘Darwin-
ian’’ synthesis with Mendelism had to await the passing of a generation of
scientists that defended (Pearson, Cook, Wallace) or criticized (Morgan,
Punnett, Bateson) Darwin’s theory in its original non-Mendelian form.
Finally, we note an interesting diﬀerence with Gayon, who argues that
‘‘the decline of Darwinism was virtually always attributed to the experi-
mental refutation of the hypothesis of ‘natural selection’ in the highly
restrictive sense that Darwin had intended’’ (Gayon, 1998, p. 2). This
might suggest that Gayon’s interpretation aligns closely with our focus
here on the geneticists’ critique of ﬂuctuation. Actually, although Gayon
notes this critique, he suggests that it ‘‘turned out to be a ﬁction’’ (p. 309),
and instead locates the conﬂict between Darwinism and genetics entirely in
Darwin’s reliance on blending. Ultimately, he treats the mutationists’ cri-
tique of evolution-by-ﬂuctuation as though it were a premature rejection of
selection on small variations (e.g., pp. 103–104). One might study the
works of early geneticists in greater breadth and depth, in order to
understand which speciﬁc results were thought to refute Darwin’s theory,
and whether they were understood to refute (1) blending, (2) the herita-
bility of ﬂuctuations, or (3) the mode of evolution that combines the two.
The Inﬂuence and Non-Inﬂuence of de Vries
Though the classical narrative makes Hugo de Vries the progenitor of a
widely popular ‘‘mutationist’’ school,17 we see few indications that de
17 Sources that invoke the popularity of de Vries (e.g., Richmond 2006; Theunissen
1994; MacKenzie 1981, p. 258) invariably cite Allen (1969). Perhaps de Vries’s dis-
tinctive views – progressive mutations, partially heritable ﬂuctuations, rare mutation
periods, elementary species – were widely popular, but Allen’s analysis does not
establish this. Allen’s claim of a ‘‘large number of workers’’ who ‘‘supported the theory
with varying degrees of enthusiasm’’ refers to a footnote that lists exactly 14 scientists
(p. 66). After explaining how a few of these scientists, such as Morgan, were excited by
the prospect of ﬁnding mutations, Allen goes on to list 7 opponents. He does not seem
to consider the possibility that ‘‘mutation’’ might be a very general concept welcomed by
scientists who did not accept de Vries’s special theories. For instance, he cites Metcalf as
a ‘‘follower’’ (p. 78), but an examination of the cited work (Metcalf 1905) reveals no
particular allegiance to de Vries’s special views.
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Vries’s specialized ideas inﬂuenced leading geneticists. They embraced
some of his terminology, but not its meaning. For leading geneticists,
the signiﬁcance of de Vries’s work was that it ﬁnally laid to rest any
doubts that, in a state of nature, deﬁnitely heritable types could arise
suddenly and be propagated indeﬁnitely.
Though this does not directly contradict the widespread belief that de
Vries’s views were widely popular, it raises questions about the nature and
extent of this allegedpopularity. Clearly the idea ofmutationwas inﬂuential,
as was the idea of dramatic or monstrous mutations (e.g., Hoquet, 2010;
Richmond, 2010). Kingsland (1991) argues that the popularity of de Vries’s
view had much to do with the way that it promised to empower plant
breeders to improve domestic crops and to contribute to debates on evolu-
tion. Which scientiﬁc communities were the most inﬂuenced by de Vries?
Howmuchdid themisapprehensionofdeVries’s views reﬂect the complexity
and disorganization of his written works, which have taken many years for
historians todecipher evenpartially?18Certainly itwouldbepossible to study
howdeVries’s viewswere received by the complete set of geneticists active in
the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century, following Buttolph’s (2008) study.
The Missing Pieces Theory
The classical narrative denies a theoretical clash between Darwinism
and Mendelism, and articulates their relationship in terms of the
‘‘missing piece’’ theory, in which Mendelism is the ‘‘perfect comple-
ment’’ to Darwin (Provine, 1971, p. 130), and the decades-long failure of
scientists to perceive this perfect ﬁt is an ‘‘inexplicable embarrassment’’
(Hull, 1985). The popularity of this view is indicated by Bowler’s (1988)
complaint that ‘‘the Darwin industry has followed Fisher’s assumption
that genetics merely ﬁlls in the gaps in Darwin’s thinking’’ (p. 130).
The ﬁrst problemwith themissing pieces theory, pointed out byBowler, is
that the pieces are not missing. Darwin promulgated both (1) a phenome-
nological theory of variation (i.e., empirical or descriptive ‘‘laws’’), and (2) a
mechanistic theory of variation (pangenesis) to account for these laws via
reproductive physiology (seeWinther, 2000). Bothwere wrong. The problem
ofhereditywasnot ‘‘left unsolved’’ byDarwin (Allen, 1980,p. 361),but solved
incorrectly. Fisher refers to thatwhich is absent froma ‘‘structure ﬁrst erected
by Darwin’’ (Fisher, 1930, p. ix), as though this ‘‘structure’’ were a Platonic
18 Theunissen (1994) writes in regard to de Vries’s magnum opus, ‘‘Considering the
book’s excessive length and apparently chaotic organization it is perhaps not too sur-
prising that a complete analysis of the work has never been attempted’’ (p. 239). Perhaps
de Vries’s scientiﬁc peers likewise never fully understood his complex thinking.
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form seen only partly by Darwin, and recognized fully by Fisher. In reality,
Fisher has deleted some ofDarwin’s deliberate choices. Thus, onemust reject
the idea of ‘‘missing’’ pieces: at best, this is a theory of substituted pieces.
How does this substitution change Darwin’s theory? If we are to allow
Fisher to re-engineer the inner workings of Darwin’s theory, the revised
theory must generate the same kinds of hypotheses, predictions and
explanations as the original – otherwise we have no basis for representing it
as the same theory. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that
Mendelian evolutionary genetics does not guarantee Darwinian behavior.
Mendelian evolutionary genetics clearly allows neutral evolution (Kimura,
1983), changes that depend on individual events of mutation (Blount et al.,
2008), and other non-Darwinian behavior mentioned earlier, including
non-gradual changes, and parallelisms or trends due to biases in variation.
Thus, the ‘‘perfect complement’’ to Darwin’s thinking cannot be
Mendelism per se, but could be some version of Mendelism restricted with
auxiliary theories or assumptions to reject alternatives and ensure com-
patibility. The nature of these auxiliary theories is evident in Provine’s
analysis. TheMendelians accepted a non-exclusive role for small variations
and smooth change, but this does not qualify them as Darwinians. Instead,
the decisive issue is the capacity of ‘‘selection’’ to shift the mean value of a
trait beyond the observed range of the initial population, without new
mutations, relying instead on recombination of abundant variation present
in the initial population.19 Provine calls this capacity ‘‘the eﬀectiveness of
selection.’’ In his narrative, the historic battle to establish the foundations
of modern neo-Darwinism (at least, among geneticists) is won by about
1919 when key geneticists accept ‘‘the eﬀectiveness of selection’’ as the sine
qua non of evolution.20
19 Note that the ‘‘eﬀectiveness of selection’’ is based on recombination. In this con-
text, ‘‘recombination’’ is not limited to recombining genes on homologous chromo-
somes by crossing over, but implicates any process that brings together new
combinations, including sexual mixis and re-assortment of non-homologous chromo-
somes.
20 For instance, Provine’s position is evident in his treatment of East. He quotes East’s
1910 description of a process of sorting out pre-existing varieties and concludes that
East had ‘‘not discovered the full implications of recombination for evolutionary
adaptation… East was unaware of the immense possibility for genetic recombination to
occur within the population and was in substantial agreement with Johannsen, Jennings
and Pearl’’ (Provine 1971, p. 119). On this basis, Provine puts East (as of 1910) in the
camp of Johannsen and the non-Darwinian ‘‘pure-linists’’ who have not achieved a true
synthesis. Provine’s interpretation of Johannsen is disputed by Roll-Hansen (1980), on
the grounds that Johannsen included recombination in his understanding of evolu-
tionary change. Earlier, we made the same point about Punnett, who clearly included
recombination in his evolutionary thinking.
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That is, the justiﬁcation of Darwinism depends on the notion that
selection can create new forms without mutation, which Darwin,
Pearson, and Castle (arguably, for a time) had believed for the wrong
reasons. The new Mendelian version of this justiﬁcation hinges on the
superﬁcial appearance that selection creates new forms without muta-
tion, even though this involves a conceptual sleight-of-hand that be-
stows credit on ‘‘selection’’ for the new combinations accomplished by
unseen events of recombination (as pointed out by Nei, 2013, p. 38),
while avoiding the question of how mutations become involved in
evolution (as, presumably, they must).
Nevertheless, according to the classical view of Provine, this is the
essence of the Modern Synthesis as a theory of evolutionary genetics: if
we replace the blending and indeﬁnite variability (in Darwin’s theory)
with Fisherian change given the availability of abundant multifactorial
variation created by recombination, we get a quasi-Darwinian genetical
view that explains evolution via ‘‘natural selection.’’ Gayon does not
accept the missing piece theory, but invokes precisely the same auxiliary
theories as Provine to explain how a Darwinian mode of evolution is
‘‘rehabilitated’’ in a Mendelian world.21
Given that it is possible to formulate a Mendelian theory of evolu-
tion with Darwinesque behavior, the remaining issue is whether scien-
tists understand the resulting theory to be suﬃcient. Clearly they do not.
Though quantitative genetics – the branch of theory that, following
Fisher (1918), depicts smooth change based on abundant inﬁnitesimal
variation – is clearly an important topic in evolution, it is neither the
foundation, nor the acme, nor the majority of evolutionary theory: it
does not dominate textbooks of evolutionary genetics, but is one of a
handful of separate topics (e.g., see Hartl and Clark, 1997; Gillespie,
1998). Presumably no biologist today believes that this branch is a
suﬃcient theory of evolution: it would be rejected for its failure to
accommodate various non-Darwinian behavior noted earlier, e.g.,
evolution dependent on a single lucky mutation.
In short, if we treat the rehabilitation of Darwin’s theory narrowly as
the Mendelian theory of quantitative evolutionary genetics, then it
clearly is not the foundation of evolutionary biology, but a sub-theory;
21 In Gayon’s account, it is not a Darwinian theory or mechanism that is ‘‘rehabili-
tated,’’ but a distinctly Darwinian conception or principle of selection as a shape-
shifting force that is, in eﬀect, reduced to a consequence of Fisherian quantitative
genetics. Gayon clearly rejects the ‘‘missing piece’’ and, accordingly, the idea that
Darwin’s theory was restored in an intact form. Instead, the synthesis with Mendelism
created a hybrid view ‘‘profoundly reorganized in its internal theoretical structure’’ (p.
13), including a ‘‘subtle but decisive modiﬁcation of the principle of selection’’ (p. 253).
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if we treat this fusion broadly as a synthesis of genetics, selection and
mutation, then it is not always Darwinian in behavior, and it is not the
work of the Modern Synthesis, but of the early Mendelians.
Thus, the paradoxical ‘‘missing piece’’ argument is problematic as
history, as philosophy, and as science. The early decades of the twen-
tieth century become an inexplicable embarrassment in the classical
view, precisely because of the premise that genetics is the perfect com-
plement to Darwinism. If we reject this same premise, a diﬀerent picture
emerges. Johannsen’s experiments were profoundly inﬂuential, not be-
cause scientists of his time were easily confused and prone to stampede,
but because he rigorously tested and rejected a major theory, while
demonstrating a successful alternative (Roll-Hansen, 1989). Pearson
and his biometrical school resisted Mendelism, not because they disliked
Mendelians personally and opposed manipulative experiments, but
because they were committed to a non-Mendelian view of evolution
with a strong claim to being the correct interpretation of Darwin’s
theory (see also Roll-Hansen 1980). The Modern Synthesis was delayed
because both partners in the marriage of Darwinism and genetics had to
be dragged, kicking and screaming, into the union, which combined an
unjustiﬁably loose interpretation of Darwin with an unjustiﬁably nar-
row and speculative view of population genetics.
The Non-Darwinian Synthesis
Some recent work identiﬁes a scourge of ‘‘Synthesis Historiography’’
(Amundson, 2005), and a desire to escape from triumphalist or self-
serving narratives emanating from the architects of the Modern Syn-
thesis (e.g., Mayr’s Essentialism Story). Apropos, the parochial nature
of the ‘‘missing piece’’ theory is revealed strikingly in Fisher’s 1930
critique of Bateson, which is the origin of the theory, according to
Bowler (1988, p. 130) or Peterson (2008, p. 271). Actually, Fisher is not
the original source. He had asked for an opinion on Bateson from his
mentor Major Leonard Darwin (to whom Fisher would dedicate his
1930 book), and the latter obliged with the following scathing account
(see Bennett, 1983, pp. 95–96):
In the future the great merit of Mendelism will be seen to rest on
the proof that the ingredients of germ plasm on which heredity
depends are located in pairs in each organism, one of each pair
selected by chance disappearing at each sexual union…. The merit
for this discovery must mainly rest with Mendel, whilst among our
countrymen, Bateson played the leading part in its rediscovery.
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Unfortunately he was unable to grasp the mathematical and sta-
tistical aspects of biology, and from this and other causes, he was
not only incapable of framing an evolutionary theory himself, but
entirely failed to see how Mendelism supplied the missing parts of
the structure ﬁrst erected by Darwin. Nothing but harm can come
from following Bateson in regard to evolution theory, though his
name will come to be honoured for his pioneer work in Mendelism
when what he failed to do as regards theory has been accomplished.
Leonard Darwin admitted that he was not familiar with Bateson’s ac-
tual work, and wrote ‘‘having written it, I daresay I should tear it up,
and advise you to do ditto.’’ Fisher ignored this advice and used a
revised version of the text above (Fisher, 1930, p. ix). In other words,
the ﬁrst draft of the classical view, complete with the missing pieces
theory (and the meme of the Mendelians’ cognitive deﬁciency), was
written by Charles Darwin’s son, and published by the premier architect
of neo-Darwinian gradualism, in a willful conspiracy to remain ignorant
of what Bateson actually believed.
The classical view nonetheless serves a useful purpose as a depiction
of the main line of development of evolutionary thought, as it appeared to
followers of Darwin 50 years ago. For them, the view promoted by
Fisher, Dobzhansky, Mayr, et al. is the correct and decisive synthesis of
genetics and evolution: the integration of Mendelism into evolutionary
theory was not complete until it was possible to argue that, in a Men-
delian world, (1) a creative Darwinian mode of ‘‘natural selection’’ is
possible, by which the struggle for life shapes phenotypes by gathering
masses of individually minor variations, and (2) all alternatives –
including saltationism and the ‘‘lucky mutant’’ view – must be rejected,
as per Provine’s (1978, 1986) revisionary view of the Modern Synthesis
as a ‘‘constriction’’ (similar to the ‘‘restriction’’ view of Gould, 2002, pp.
505–518). That is, the premise of the Modern Synthesis, and of the
classical historiographic view, is that genetics justiﬁes Darwin’s view
and undermines all alternatives, precisely as argued in the opening pages
of Fisher (1930).
The scientiﬁc reasoning underlying this premise, most of which has
been discussed, is as follows. Mendelism rules out Lamarckism and
direct eﬀects. Orthogenesis is alleged to have no valid mechanism.
Fisherian quantitative genetics rationalizes a Darwinian mode of evo-
lution, but does not exclude alternatives. The keystone is the multifac-
torial view, which later developed into a picturesque ‘‘gene pool’’:
natural populations ‘‘maintain’’ abundant variation, remixing it via
recombination every generation, so that selection never waits for a new
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mutation, but ﬁnds abundant variation ready at hand to create a
smooth adaptive response to new conditions (see Stoltzfus, 2006; Mc-
Candlish and Stoltzfus, 2014). As Mayr (1994) writes in an article
entitled ‘‘The Resistance to Darwinism and the Misconceptions on
which it was Based’’
Those authors who thought that mutations alone supplied the
variability on which selection can act, often called natural selection
a chance theory. They said that evolution had to wait for the lucky
accident of a favorable mutation before natural selection could
become active. This is now known to be completely wrong.
Recombination provides in every generation abundant variation on
which the selection of the relatively better adapted members of a
population can work. (p. 38)
Mayr’s claims are not accepted today. The ‘‘gene pool’’ theory, which
Provine (2001, p. 201) now considers to be ‘‘one of the most artiﬁcial
concepts of population genetics,’’ appears to be a hand-waving theory
that never fully materialized. Contemporary evolutionary geneticists do
not view the abundance of variation in the ‘‘gene pool’’, and the ability
of recombination to produce new variation every generation, as the sine
qua non of evolution (e.g., see Woodruﬀ and Thompson, 1998; or the
comment on recombination by Provine, 2001, p. 201). To the contrary,
models that invoke new mutations not only are considered allowable,
but are used so commonly that they sometimes are referenced as the
default view (see Barrett and Schluter, 2008; Hermisson and Pennings,
2005).
A new light is cast on the works of early geneticists by the realization
that contemporary evolutionary geneticists (1) remain advocates of
Mendelism, mutation and selection, (2) have undermined or discarded
the claims that re-established Darwinism, and (3) hold views about
variational causes of saltation, creativity, parallelism, and directionality
that are understood historically to be non-Darwinian or anti-Darwin-
ian. Their Mendelian-Mutationist view was a post-Darwinian, pre-
Modern Synthesis, featuring a robust skepticism of adaptationism and
an emphasis – lacking in the Modern Synthesis but present in con-
temporary thinking (Pigliucci, 2009) – on saltation, stochasticity, indi-
vidual events of mutation, and the creative or dispositional role of the
process of variation. Contemporary evolutionists may align themselves
with Darwin and his followers, imagining that they have nothing in
common with the ‘‘notorious skeptics’’ of the eclipse period, with their
‘‘mystical ideas’’ (Charlesworth and Charlesworth, 2009), yet contem-
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porary neutralist, mutationist and evo-devo perspectives would have
been rejected from the Modern Synthesis for being non-Darwinian.
This view again raises numerous questions. It is no less whiggish than
the classical view: we simply have shifted the point of reference from
1959 to the present. Perhaps the most interesting question is how well
the scientists who earned their place in the classical view truly under-
stood the implications of identifying with Darwin and rejecting Punnett,
Morgan and Bateson. Clearly they rejected a caricature called ‘‘muta-
tionism’’ – evolution by dramatic mutations without selection. Yet, just
as Fisher never tried to understand Bateson’s views, the evolutionists
who emerged from the ‘‘eclipse’’ with a synthetic view may have treated
the early geneticists as a poisoned well, ignoring their views, and
imagining that the combination of Mendelism, mutation and selection
was theirs to claim on behalf of Darwin – or rather, on behalf of a re-
invented version of Darwin as an unfulﬁlled Mendelian.
For practical reasons, we chose to restrict this study to the major
works of four early geneticists known for their heterodox evolutionary
views. There are various ways in which a change in scope or approach
might yield a diﬀerent story. Our picture of an early synthesis is shaped
signiﬁcantly by our treatment of de Vries and our decision to include
Punnett. De Vries is the outlier in this group of four, and thus we
construct a ‘‘Mendelian-mutationist synthesis’’ largely without his dis-
tinctive views. Yet his actual historical inﬂuence in deﬁning a scientiﬁc
alternative to Darwinism might have been stronger. Our inclusion of
Punnett is justiﬁable, yet he (alone) could be re-classiﬁed as part of the
second wave of early Mendelians, and if so, our story again would be
diﬀerent. For instance, if we placed Bateson, de Vries and Morgan –
perhaps with Johannsen – in a ﬁrst wave of genetical founders, we could
attribute them with a powerful and successful critique of Darwin’s
theory, but it might be more diﬃcult to identify a shared alternative
view among these four.
The second wave of pre-1910 geneticists, including Punnett, Lock,
Pearl, East, Jennings, et al., clearly developed a synthetic view before
1918. From Kim’s (1994) analysis of how the multifactorial view
emerged, we suspect that focusing on the contributions of this second
wave (e.g., using the list of early geneticists provided by Buttolph, 2008)
would further undermine the notion of an ‘‘eclipse.’’
None of this would aﬀect our arguments that the early geneticists’
critique of Darwin’s theory has a sound basis; that the conceptual
foundations of evolutionary genetics were laid by geneticists during the
‘‘eclipse’’; and that, relative to their view of evolution, and to contem-
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porary views, the Modern Synthesis appears as an unwarranted
restriction.
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